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290 The OECD’s Fiscal Federalism 2016 – Making Decentralisation Work analyses 
in which institutional frameworks and to what extent fiscal autonomy of sub-cen-
tral governments (hereinafter: SCGs) is desirable and possible on both the expendi-
ture and the revenue sides. The book is the latest publication by Fiscal Federalism 
Network, created in 2004 with the aim of providing OECD countries with ana-
lytical and statistical support and facilitating decision-making in the organization 
of fiscal relations across levels of government. Each of the six accessible and 
easy-to-read chapters abounds with case studies and cross-country analyses, con-
sistently with the purpose of the book – to analyse and propose reform options for 
intergovernmental fiscal frameworks and sub-central public finance.
What is the extent to which SCGs are given autonomy? The first chapter provides 
an overview of fiscal decentralization and intergovernmental fiscal reforms in 
OECD countries. It is emphasized that standard fiscal indicators – such as sub-
central spending and revenue shares or the size and composition of intergovern-
mental grants – are insufficient for an assessment of the multidimensional concept 
of fiscal decentralization. This is why a proposal to use the new, institutional indi-
cators – such as tax autonomy, spending power or intergovernmental grant condi-
tionality – can be seen as a completely new approach to the assessment of fiscal 
decentralization. While standard indicators are based solely on the fiscal capacities 
of SCGs, new indicators are defined by their institutional capacities and relations 
with upper-tier government. This makes particular sense in countries where tastes, 
preferences and attitudes towards the public sector vary according to jurisdictions.
Fiscal rules and frameworks are concerned with how historical turning points can 
create the basis for constitutional reform options in today’s environment. Although 
constitutional set-ups vary widely from one country to another, all differences can 
be reduced to a single dimension – the level of constitutional decentralization, 
within which three types of federation are distinguished: decentralized, integrated 
and (somewhere in-between) quasi-decentralized. This chapter contributes to the 
understanding of intergovernmental relations and fiscal decentralization by 
emphasizing the need for coherence of fiscal constitutions – for example, how 
much spending autonomy matches tax autonomy or whether fiscal rules are 
aligned with the fiscal responsibility of state and local governments. Although 
fiscal constitution is a country-specific term, some common elements are high-
lighted on the path toward greater coherence, which should be useful to policy 
makers in the implementation of constitutional or other policy reforms.
Chapter 3 addresses the opportunities and challenges of property taxation as a 
typical local tax. Since upper-tier governments determine the tax base, any reform 
of property tax regimes must therefore be tied to reforms of intergovernmental 
fiscal frameworks. That is why part of this chapter is about a property tax that is 
revenue neutral, which requires amendments to both spending and taxation across 
all tiers of government. Although in most OECD countries, since 2008, property 



















































41 (2) 289-293 (2017)
291constitutions, frameworks and rules, the chapter concludes that property tax 
reform is deeply country-specific and must be carefully implemented to fit spe-
cific circumstances. Therefore, it is a great challenge to find common elements of 
reform options for all OECD countries, especially considering different constitu-
tional settings in unitary and federal governments.
Taxes or grants: which revenue source for sub-central governments? SCGs are 
trying to establish a balance between own taxes and intergovernmental transfers, 
which is conditioned by decisions at all levels of government. Although the 
importance of own sources of funding is clear, the chapter also states that inter-
governmental grants still have a role to play, as they can help reduce differences 
in tax raising capacity or inter-jurisdictional externalities. However, for that pur-
pose they would have to be around half of their current size. First, if the fiscal 
autonomy and spending power of SCGs (and thus own tax revenues) increase, the 
role of intergovernmental grants becomes less important. Grants do not give SCGs 
much freedom to decide on their spending levels. Second, unlike grants, own 
taxes increase government accountability and may affect citizens’ greater involve-
ment in budget processes. This is because most grants are earmarked for specific 
purposes and citizens have no impact on the allocation of these funds. Third, reli-
ance on grants affects SCGs’ sustainability as, unlike own taxes, grants tend to 
ease the budget constraint and lead to overspending.
Chapter 5 discusses a very important topic in the context of fiscal decentralization 
– monitoring SCG borrowing. It explores and analyses how different SCG 
borrowing mechanisms work in OECD countries. Among other things, the most 
discussed are fiscal rules and direct control by higher levels of government. The 
chapter is permeated with useful examples of completed and started fiscal reforms 
and expenditure and debt restrictions. Also, one box is devoted to the effects of 
bailout expectations – a situation of economic stress when SCGs may expect 
central governments to bail them out with additional resources, which again points 
to the importance of the adequate establishment and management of intergovern-
mental fiscal relations.
Finally, the last chapter presents the definition, scope and preliminary results of a 
pilot study on the extent to which SCGs enjoy autonomy in the design of public 
services. The chapter provides evidence of the limited power of SCGs over their 
own spending that could have negative effects on public service efficiency. The 
study was carried out in a five countries1 in 2009 and has resulted in the introduc-
tion of a new SCG spending power indicator. Since the spending power of SCGs 
is largely determined by the legal frameworks, rules and regulations of the upper 
tier government, the new indicator takes into account different categories of 
autonomy, which should explain the extent of control that SCGs exert over the 
1 Of the five countries taken in the pilot study, Germany and Switzerland are federal and Denmark, Portugal 



















































41 (2) 289-293 (2017)
292 budget. The main findings show that spending power varies across countries and 
services and is often shared. However, the final indicator seems not yet to have 
been determined, although the results of the pilot study and its possible applica-
tion to more countries in future studies can only contribute to the re-design of 
individual elements of spending responsibility across all tiers of government. In 
that sense, this chapter makes the biggest contribution of the entire book.
In general, the book is very well structured, divided into six, clearly presented 
chapters. Though the chapter contents can act as separate stories, what pervades 
each of them is the importance of adequate fiscal constitutions so that relations 
between central and sub-central governments can support fiscal decentralization 
and the autonomy of SCGs. In this book, the reader is confronted with the compi-
lation of some of the most salient policy issues in fiscal federalism, where many 
examples illustrate the current fiscal policies, but also the policy reform options. 
For example, chapter 3 provides guidelines for reforming the tax on immovable 
property that can contribute to a strategic shift away from taxation of labour to-
wards less distorting taxes. 
Compared to the previous edition of fiscal federalism – OECD (2013) where the 
main contribution was the guidelines for fiscal reform based on the set of country 
case studies in Blöchliger and Vammalle (2012) – this book seems to be much 
more specific in developing a new institutional indicator for measuring the spend-
ing power of SCGs. Although the spending power indicator tree is applied to only 
the five countries in the pilot study, application to a number of countries would 
probably help re-design the assignment of spending responsibility at all levels of 
government. Therefore, the book is mandatory reading for all policy makers and 
is also useful for individuals, civil society groups, professional associations and 
the private sector. The book should also be of particular interest to all citizens 
concerned with their local community in order to get acquainted with legal 
possibilities and constraints and the possibilities of engaging in decision-making 
processes at the local level.
Although budget transparency and public participation are mentioned in certain 
parts of some chapters (e.g. chapter 5 on transparency and chapter 4 on civic 
engagement), the impression remains that much more devotion should have been 
made to this topic. In order for public finances to become more efficient, equitable 
and sustainable, greater government accountability and citizens’ trust are needed. 
Due to this, local budget transparency can serve as the basis and the first step 
for direct public participation in budget processes in order for a more efficient 
resource allocation to be achieved. For if citizens are satisfied with the services 
they receive, the level of autonomy, intergovernmental relations and spending 
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